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The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment.  It 
ensures that the state’s power to punish is exercised within the bounds of 
evolving standards of human decency.  At the time of its enactment in 1791, 
the Eighth Amendment merely protected against torture and other physically 
barbarous treatments.  However, as society’s standards of decency changed, 
so too did the scope of the Eighth Amendment.  Today, among other 
protections, the Eighth Amendment mandates that prisons provide inmates 
with adequate conditions of confinement.  This includes an obligation on the 
part of the prison to provide adequate medical care.  But a great deal of 
controversy exists as to what exactly adequate medical care requires.  In the 
context of transgender inmates, circuit courts are split over the necessity of 
providing gender confirmation surgery.  While some courts believe that 
blanket bans on such surgery are constitutional, others prescribe a case-by-
case analysis to determine the constitutionality of a prison’s denial of gender 
confirmation surgery.  This Note explores the divergence between these two 
approaches and argues that a case-by-case approach better comports with 
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INTRODUCTION 
Transgender individuals1 are incarcerated at a significantly higher rate 
than their cisgender2 counterparts.3  Due to disproportionately high rates of 
poverty among transgender communities and discriminatory profiling, one in 
six transgender individuals will be incarcerated during their lifetime.4  Once 
imprisoned, transgender individuals are among the most vulnerable inmates 
in the prison population.5  These inmates are subjected to unprecedented rates 
 
 1. Transgender individuals are those whose gender identity is different from their “sex 
assigned at birth.” Transgender Identity Terms and Labels, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, 
https://www.plannedparenthood.org/learn/gender-identity/transgender/transgender-identity-
terms-and-labels [https://perma.cc/7V6C-AGWL] (last visited Apr. 14, 2021). 
 2. Cisgender individuals identify with the “sex they were assigned at birth.” Id. 
 3. See Tara Dunnavant, Note, Bye-Bye Binary:  Transgender Prisoners and the 
Regulation of Gender in the Law, 9 FED. CTS. L. REV., no. 1, 2016, at 15, 19. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See Richard Edney, To Keep Me Safe from Harm?:  Transgender Prisoners and the 
Experience of Imprisonment, 9 DEAKIN L. REV. 327, 328 (2004). 
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of abuse and harassment, not only from other inmates but also from the prison 
authorities themselves.6 
The challenges faced by transgender inmates are visible in many different 
forms.  For one, many transgender inmates are subjected to “humiliation and 
degradation” from prison staff and other prisoners.7  Transgender inmates are 
considered “the lowest rung on the totem pole” and, as a result, endure verbal 
and physical abuse.8 
Further, transgender prisoners often fall victim to sexual abuse.9  
Approximately 40 percent of transgender inmates report being sexually 
assaulted while imprisoned.10  This rate of abuse is ten times greater than that 
of the general prison population.11  This partly results from prison policies 
that place inmates in facilities in accordance with their genitalia and birth-
assigned sex rather than by their gender identities.12 
To compound the problem, transgender inmates often cannot seek 
protection.  Prison officials generally “turn a blind eye” to these abuses and 
sometimes even encourage them.13  In fact, transgender inmates are five 
times more likely than cisgender inmates to be sexually abused by prison 
staff.14  If prison authorities seek to rectify this mistreatment at all, they often 
place the transgender inmate in solitary confinement.15  This can cause 
serious psychological harm and trauma equivalent to that of torture.16 
 
 6. See NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., LGBTQ PEOPLE BEHIND BARS:  A GUIDE 
TO UNDERSTANDING THE ISSUES FACING TRANSGENDER PRISONERS AND THEIR LEGAL RIGHTS, 
6 (2018), https://transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/resources/TransgenderPeople 
BehindBars.pdf [https://perma.cc/G9BD-HJVG]. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Tammi S. Etheridge, Safety v. Surgery:  Sex Reassignment Surgery and the Housing 
of Transgender Inmates, 15 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 585, 601 (2014) (quoting SYLVIA RIVERA L. 
PROJECT, “IT’S WAR IN HERE”:  A REPORT ON THE TREATMENT OF TRANSGENDER AND INTERSEX 
PEOPLE IN NEW YORK STATE MEN’S PRISONS 26 (2007), https://srlp.org/files/warinhere.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VY2E-Q6WB])). 
 9. See Dunnavant, supra note 3, at 19. 
 10. NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., supra note 6, at 6. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Dunnavant, supra note 3, at 19. 
 13. See Darren Rosenblum, Trapped in Sing Sing:  Transgendered Prisoners Caught in 
the Gender Binarism, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 499, 525 (2000). 
 14. SANDY E. JAMES ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., THE REPORT OF THE 
2015 U.S. TRANSGENDER SURVEY 192 (2017), https://transequality.org/sites/default 
/files/docs/usts/USTS-Full-Report-Dec17.pdf [https://perma.cc/F689-SFCB]. 
 15. NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., supra note 6, at 6. 
 16. Id. 
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Additionally, transgender inmates, specifically those with gender 
dysphoria,17 face serious barriers to receiving adequate medical care.18  
These inmates often seek hormone therapy, counseling, gender confirmation 
surgery (GCS), and other transition-related accommodations to alleviate their 
dysphoria.19  However, prison officials commonly block access to such 
treatment through restrictive policies such as “freeze-frames” and blanket 
bans.20 
In an effort to combat these oppressive policies, gender dysphoric inmates 
have sought recourse under the Eighth Amendment.21  The Eighth 
Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment.22  The U.S. Supreme 
Court has held that the Eighth Amendment requires prisons to provide 
inmates with conditions of confinement that comport with evolving standards 
of decency.23 
In litigation, gender dysphoric inmates have asserted that a prison’s failure 
to provide transition-related medical care violates the Eighth Amendment.24  
While courts generally have acknowledged some duty on the part of prisons 
to provide transition-related care, the extent of such duty remains contested.25  
Specifically, much debate surrounds prisons’ obligation to provide GCS.26 
Without any guidance from the Supreme Court, circuit courts have been 
left to determine the constitutionality of prisons’ denial of GCS.27  The circuit 
courts first addressed this issue in Kosilek v. Spencer.28  Although the First 
 
 17. Gender dysphoria is a medical condition characterized by significant distress or 
impairment resulting from an incongruence between one’s gender identity and sex assigned at 
birth. See infra Part I.C.1.  Some, but not all, transgender individuals suffer from gender 
dysphoria.  Jack Drescher, et al., Expert Q & A:  Gender Dysphoria, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, 
https://www.psychiatry.org/patients-families/gender-dysphoria/expert-q-and-a 
[https://perma.cc/XZ95-Z86B] (last visited Apr. 14, 2021).  This Note focuses specifically on 
the Eighth Amendment remedies available for gender dysphoric inmates. 
 18. See Samantha Braver, Note, Circuit Court Dysphoria:  The Status of Gender 
Confirmation Surgery Requests by Incarcerated Transgender Individuals, 120 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2235, 2247 (2020) (stating that it is exceedingly difficult for transgender inmates, 
particularly gender dysphoric inmates, to receive proper medical care). 
 19. See Yvette K. W. Bourcicot & Daniel Hirotsu Woofter, Prudent Policy:  
Accommodating Prisoners with Gender Dysphoria, 12 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 283, 286, 304 
(2016). 
 20. See Transgender Incarcerated People in Crisis, LAMBDA LEGAL, 
https://www.lambdalegal.org/know-your-rights/article/trans-incarcerated-people 
[https://perma.cc/3B2W-GPE9] (last visited Apr. 14, 2021).  “Freeze-frame” policies “freeze 
treatment options for incarcerated transgender individuals at the level of treatment they 
received prior to their incarceration.” Braver, supra note 18, at 2247. 
 21. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Kallas, 895 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2018); Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 
550 (7th Cir. 2011); De’Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 22. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 23. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). 
 24. See infra Part I.C. 
 25. See Jordan Rogers, Note, Being Transgender Behind Bars in the Era of Chelsea 
Manning:  How Transgender Prisoners’ Rights Are Changing, 6 ALA. C.R. & C.L.L. REV. 
189, 195 (2015). 
 26. See infra Part III. 
 27. See infra Parts II, III. 
 28. 774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014). 
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Circuit’s holding in Kosilek was clear—the prison’s denial of GCS did not 
amount to cruel and unusual punishment—the implications are more 
obscure.29  Both the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have relied on Kosilek in 
deciding the constitutionality of a blanket ban on GCS; however, these 
circuits are split on the issue.30  On the one hand, in Gibson v. Collier,31 the 
Fifth Circuit held that a prison’s blanket ban on GCS is constitutional because 
such surgery is never medically necessary.32  On the other hand, in Edmo v. 
Corizon, Inc.,33 the Ninth Circuit found a similar blanket ban on GCS 
unconstitutional on the basis that such treatment can be medically 
necessary.34  Accordingly, Edmo urged courts to undertake a case-by-case 
analysis to assess whether a prison’s denial of GCS constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment.35 
This Note examines the aforementioned circuit split between the Fifth and 
Ninth Circuits in the context of the Eighth Amendment’s requirement that 
punishments comport with evolving standards of decency.  In doing so, this 
Note not only addresses the requirements for bringing an Eighth Amendment 
inadequate medical care claim but also explores whether there is a place for 
blanket bans within larger Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.  Finally, this 
Note discusses this circuit split within its larger societal framework in an 
attempt to gauge contemporary standards of decency, considering both the 
increased accessibility and acceptance of GCS, and the overarching national 
movement to promote civil rights. 
Part I of this Note provides the framework for understanding the Eighth 
Amendment claims brought by transgender inmates.  Specifically, Parts I.A 
and I.B discusses the foundations of the Eighth Amendment, its connection 
to the evolving standards of decency, and its application to inadequate 
medical care claims.  Part I.C then explores the conditions that prompt 
transgender inmates to bring such claims.  Part II discusses Kosilek, the first 
case in which a circuit court addressed whether a transgender inmate has an 
Eighth Amendment right to GCS and explains Kosilek’s importance in the 
current circuit split.  Next, Part III explores the split between the Fifth and 
Ninth Circuits regarding the constitutionality of prisons’ denial of GCS.  
Lastly, Part IV takes the position that a blanket ban is contrary to the evolving 
standards of decency, incompatible with existing Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence, inconsistent with the consensus among the medical 
community, and also a product of flawed case law.  As a result, this part sides 
with Edmo and urges courts to engage in a case-by-case analysis. 
 
 29. See infra Part II.B. 
 30. See infra Part III. 
 31. 920 F.3d 212 (5th Cir.). 
 32. Id. at 223, 228. 
 33. 935 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam), reh’g denied, 949 F.3d 489 (9th Cir. 2020), 
stay denied sub nom. Idaho Dep’t of Corr. v. Edmo, 140 S. Ct. 2800 (2020) (Kagan, J., in 
chambers), and cert. denied, No. 19-1280, 2020 WL 6037411 (U.S. Oct. 13, 2020). 
 34. See id. at 796–97. 
 35. Id. at 796. 
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I.  THE FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING TRANSGENDER INMATES’ 
EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS 
This part provides the foundation for understanding the Eighth 
Amendment claims brought by transgender inmates.  Part I.A introduces the 
Eighth Amendment.  Part I.A discusses the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 
on cruel and unusual punishment, explains how courts have used this 
language to challenge both prisoners’ sentences and conditions of 
confinement, and highlights the importance of adhering to evolving standards 
of decency.  Part I.B then explores a frequently challenged condition of 
confinement—inadequate medical care—and lays out the two-prong test 
plaintiffs must satisfy to successfully establish such claims.  Part I.C then 
focuses specifically on the context in which transgender inmates may bring 
inadequate medical care claims.  Namely, Part I.C.1 explains gender 
dysphoria, a condition for which transgender inmates seek treatment from 
prisons, and Part I.C.2 discusses GCS, the treatment typically sought. 
A.  The Eighth Amendment 
The Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments.”36  It 
ensures that the state’s power to punish convicted criminals is “exercised 
within the limits of civilized standards.”37 
While originally drafted to protect against “physically barbarous 
treatment,” over time, courts have extended the Eighth Amendment’s 
protections beyond mere physical torture.38  Today, a wide range of 
government actions have been held to violate Eighth Amendment scrutiny.39  
Firstly, prisoners have successfully relied on the Eighth Amendment to 
challenge the constitutionality of their sentences.40  Sentences are deemed 
“cruel and unusual” when they are “‘grossly disproportionate’ to the 
 
 36. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
 37. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958). 
 38. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976).  The Eighth Amendment originally 
addressed “torture, such as the rack, the thumbscrew, the iron boot, the stretching of limbs and 
the like.” Ryan Dischinger, Note, Adequate Care for a Serious Medical Need:  Kosilek v. 
Spencer Begins the Path Toward Ensuring Inmates Receive Treatment for Gender Dysphoria, 
22 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 169, 171 (2013) (quoting O’Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339 
(1892) (Field, J., dissenting)). 
 39. See, e.g., Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 38, 40 (2010) (holding that punching, 
kicking, choking, and overall excessive physical force by a corrections officer against a 
prisoner constitutes “cruel and unusual punishment”); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570-
71 (2005) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the death penalty for criminal 
offenders under the age of eighteen); Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 126–27 (2d Cir. 2013) 
(holding that exposing prisoners to extreme temperatures, preventing prisoners from sleeping, 
providing unsanitary conditions, and failing to provide toiletries and other hygienic materials 
may all constitute “cruel and unusual punishments”). 
 40. See Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 884 (2009) (stating that the Eighth Amendment limits the “criminal 
sentences the state may impose”); see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 575; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 
U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (determining that inflicting the death penalty on an intellectually 
disabled person would be cruel and unusual punishment). 
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crime,”41 are “totally without penological justification,”42 or “involve the 
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”43 
Secondly, prisoners also invoke the Eighth Amendment to challenge their 
conditions of confinement.44  In Estelle v. Gamble,45 the Supreme Court 
established that certain deprivations suffered during imprisonment constitute 
“cruel and unusual punishments” when a prison acts with deliberate 
indifference toward an inmate’s serious need.46  Such deprivations include 
failure to provide adequate food, shelter, clothing, or medical care.47 
What constitutes cruel and unusual punishment cannot be assessed in a 
vacuum.  Courts must evaluate punishments in accordance with the Eighth 
Amendment’s “broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, 
humanity, and decency.”48  What may have been “cruel and unusual” at the 
time of the Eighth Amendment’s enactment in 1791 may be very different 
than what is cruel and unusual today.49  As such, courts look to the “evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society” when 
determining the constitutionality of a punishment.50  A punishment is cruel 
and unusual if it is inconsistent with society’s current standard of decency.51 
As societal notions of decency are constantly changing, so too are the 
actions deemed cruel and unusual.52  To navigate this complexity, courts 
generally look to objective indicia of society’s standards to determine the 
national consensus regarding a particular punishment.53  Such objective 
indicia include legislative enactments, state practices, and recent trends in the 
law indicating a change in direction.54  A national consensus denouncing a 
 
 41. Dolovich, supra note 40, at 883–84 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 
(1977)). 
 42. Id. at 884 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)).  Retribution, 
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation are penological goals sufficient to justify a 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 71 (2010). 
 43. Dolovich, supra note 40, at 884 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). 
 44. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991) (stating that the Eighth Amendment 
could be applied beyond sentencing to deprivations suffered during imprisonment). 
 45. 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
 46. See Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297. 
 47. See Dischinger, supra note 38, at 171 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 
(1994)); see also, e.g., Ball v. LeBlanc, 792 F.3d 584, 596 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding that 
housing vulnerable inmates in hot cells without access to “heat-relief measures” is 
unconstitutional); Reed v. McBride, 178 F.3d 849, 856 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating that knowingly 
depriving a prisoner of food for three to five days violates the Eighth Amendment). 
 48. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102 (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 
1968)). 
 49. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419 (2008). 
 50. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
 51. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103. 
 52. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910) (explaining that the Eighth 
Amendment “is not fastened to the obsolete, but may acquire meaning as public opinion 
becomes enlightened by a humane justice”). 
 53. Rachael Rezabek, Note, (D)evolving Standards of Decency:  The Unworkability of 
Current Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence as Illustrated by Kosilek v. Spencer, 87 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 389, 399 (2014). 
 54. Id.; see also infra Part IV.A.2 (identifying specific objective indicia relevant in 
assessing medical treatments). 
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particular punishment supports a finding that such punishment is not in line 
with civilized standards, decency, and humanity and thus, violates the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.55 
B.  Inadequate Medical Care Claims 
The adequacy of medical care is a condition of confinement that is 
frequently challenged.56  Because inmates have no choice but to rely on the 
prison to treat their medical needs, a prison’s failure to do so can cause 
serious pain, suffering, physical torture, or even death.57  In Estelle, the Court 
held that a prison inflicts cruel and unusual punishment when it acts with 
deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical need.58  This requires 
a two-prong showing.59 
First, a prisoner must satisfy an objective prong that requires proof of a 
“serious medical need.”60  A serious medical need is one “diagnosed by a 
physician as mandating treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a lay 
person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”61  Once 
a prisoner demonstrates a serious medical need, this prong also requires a 
showing that the prison provided inadequate medical care.62  A prison facility 
need not provide the most ideal treatment or even the one the prisoner prefers, 
but the treatment provided must be “at a level reasonably commensurate with 
modern medical science and of a quality acceptable within prudent 
professional standards.”63 
If the treatment provided was adequate, it does not matter that another 
medical professional might have prescribed a different course of care.64  If a 
treatment is deemed medically necessary, however, then no other care will 
be deemed adequate.65  It follows that a prison cannot issue a blanket ban on 
 
 55. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002) (finding that a punishment was cruel 
and unusual where there was a national consensus against it). 
 56. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 311 n.1 (1991) (stating that courts have “routinely” 
applied the Eighth Amendment to deprivations of medical care). 
 57. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). 
 58. Id. at 104. 
 59. Sarah Halbach, Comment, Framing a Narrative of Discrimination Under the Eighth 
Amendment in the Context of Transgender Prisoner Health Care, 105 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 463, 475 (2015). 
 60. Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 82 (1st Cir. 2014).  Besides gender dysphoria, other 
examples of recognized “serious medical needs” include “swollen ankles, inability to sleep, 
chills, tingling and numbness of hands, hyperventilation, severe back and leg pain, and double 
vision.” Loadholt v. Moore, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1279 (S.D. Ga. 2012) (citing Ancata ex rel. 
Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 702–03 (11th Cir. 1985)). 
 61. Guadreault v. Municipality of Salem, 923 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1990). 
 62. Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 85. 
 63. See United States v. DeCologero, 821 F.2d 39, 43 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 64. See Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 786 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam), reh’g 
denied, 949 F.3d 489 (9th Cir. 2020), stay denied sub nom. Idaho Dep’t of Corr. v. Edmo, 140 
S. Ct. 2800 (2020) (Kagan, J., in chambers), and cert. denied, No. 19-1280, 2020 WL 6037411 
(U.S. Oct. 13, 2020). 
 65. Bethany L. Edmondson, Note, Trans-lating the Eighth Amendment Standard:  The 
First Circuit’s Denial of a Transgender Prisoner’s Constitutional Right to Medical Treatment, 
51 GA. L. REV. 585, 592 (2017). 
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a medically necessary treatment where no other treatment will suffice.66  
Therefore, determining the necessity of the treatment is critical in assessing 
the validity of these claims.  Standards of care and practice in the medical 
community are extremely important in this analysis.67 
Once prisoners fulfill this objective prong, they must then satisfy a 
subjective prong.68  This requires proof that the prison was deliberately 
indifferent to that need.69  This component is fulfilled if the prisoner can 
prove that a prison official knew of and consciously disregarded a substantial 
risk of serious harm to the inmate’s health or safety.70  Thus, mere negligence 
or inadvertence alone is not enough to prove deliberate indifference.71  On 
the other hand, actual malice by the prison is not required.72  The prisoner 
need not prove that “a prison official acted or failed to act believing that harm 
actually would befall an inmate; it is enough that the official acted or failed 
to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.”73 
In considering this subjective prong, “security considerations inherent in 
the functioning of a penological institution must be given significant 
weight.”74  Thus, even denials of necessary medical care may not rise to the 
level of deliberate indifference if the prison based its decision on a legitimate 
concern for prisoner safety and security.75 
Finally, like all Eighth Amendment claims, inadequate medical care claims 
must be decided in the context of evolving standards of decency.76  However, 
the deceny analysis is not confined to either of the two prongs.77  Instead, 
 
 66. See Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 556, 559 (7th Cir. 2011) (rejecting a prison’s 
blanket ban on hormone therapy after finding that there was no “adequate replacement” for 
the treatment). 
 67. Edmo, 935 F.3d at 786. 
 68. Perry v. Roy, 782 F.3d 73, 78 (1st Cir. 2015). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); see also Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 
859, 865–66 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that failure to treat an inmate’s shotgun wound for four 
days amounted to deliberate indifference where the prison was aware of the injury and the 
delay in treatment caused “unnecessary pain as a result of a readily treatable condition”); Gill 
v. Mooney, 824 F.2d 192, 195–96 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding guards’ conscious refusal to follow 
a physician’s orders and provide an inmate access to the prison’s exercise facilities constituted 
deliberate indifference to his neck and back pain); Nolet v. Armstrong, 197 F. Supp. 3d 298, 
306 (D. Mass. 2016) (determining a prison nurse was deliberately indifferent to an inmate 
when she failed to refer the inmate “for further or additional treatment for his wound, despite 
observing Plaintiff’s wound for several months [and] seeing infection and [a lack of 
healing]”). 
 71. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. 
 72. Carrie S. Frank, Note, Must Inmates Be Provided Free Organ Transplants?:  
Revisiting the Deliberate Indifference Standard, 15 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 341, 352 (2005) 
(noting that deliberate indifference requires “something more than negligence, but less than 
malice”). 
 73. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. 
 74. Kosilek v. Spencer , 774 F.3d 63, 83 (1st Cir. 2014). 
 75. Id. 
 76. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). 
 77. See, e.g., Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam), reh’g 
denied, 949 F.3d 489 (9th Cir. 2020), stay denied sub nom. Idaho Dep’t of Corr. v. Edmo, 140 
S. Ct. 2800 (2020) (Kagan, J., in chambers), and cert. denied, No. 19-1280, 2020 WL 6037411 
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standards of decency are the benchmark against which each inquiry must be 
made, a thread woven throughout the entire decision.78  Only by considering 
evolving standards of decency can courts determine what a serious medical 
need is, whether there was any deliberate indifference, and ultimately, what 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.79  Despite the importance of 
adhering to evolving standards of decency, curiously, courts often do not 
explicitly examine objective indicia of society’s standards.80  Accordingly, it 
is often hard to pinpoint both exactly where the evolving standards of 
decency analysis comes into play within the two prongs and also what courts 
are relying on in determining that a treatment does or does not meet this 
standard.  However, what is clear is that punishments that do not comport 
with society’s standards of decency will be deemed cruel and unusual.81 
C.  Medical Needs Unique to Transgender Inmates 
Transgender inmates with gender dysphoria, in particular, rely on the 
Eighth Amendment when asserting their right to receive proper medical 
evaluation and treatment.82  They argue that gender dysphoria is a serious 
medical condition and that failure to provide transition-related 
accommodations, such as clothes and grooming,83 hormone therapy,84 and 
GCS, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.85  Although courts initially 
denied these claims, today, courts recognize some duty on the part of the 
prisons to treat gender dysphoria.86 
 
(U.S. Oct. 13, 2020) (discussing evolving standards of decency before beginning the two-
pronged analysis and then again in the conclusion); Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 96 (exploring 
evolving standards of decency not in the context of the two prongs but in the conclusion of 
the opinion). 
 78. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (stating that evolving standards of decency are the 
backdrop against which Eighth Amendment claims must be considered). 
 79. See Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1066–67 (9th Cir. 2014) (considering 
evolving standards of decency in determining what constitutes a serious medical need); 
McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1254 (11th Cir. 1999) (reasoning that sufficiently harmful 
acts or omissions constitute deliberate indifference only when they offend evolving standards 
of decency). 
 80. Rezabek, supra note 53, at 412. 
 81. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103. 
 82. See Halbach, supra note 59, at 474 (“[T]ransgender prisoners have turned to the 
Eighth Amendment to argue that a deprivation of hormone therapy and [GCS] constitutes 
cruel and unusual punishment.”). 
 83. See, e.g., Keohane v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr. Sec’y, 952 F.3d 1257, 1263 (11th Cir. 2020). 
 84. See, e.g., Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 555 (7th Cir. 2011) (discussing plaintiffs’ 
allegation that the prison’s blanket ban on hormone treatment violated the Eighth 
Amendment); De’Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 632 (4th Cir. 2003) (restating defendant’s 
allegation that the prison’s failure to provide her with hormone therapy treatment constituted 
cruel and unusual punishment). 
 85. See, e.g., Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 767 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam), reh’g 
denied, 949 F.3d 489 (9th Cir. 2020), stay denied sub nom. Idaho Dep’t of Corr. v. Edmo, 140 
S. Ct. 2800 (2020) (Kagan, J., in chambers), and cert. denied, No. 19-1280, 2020 WL 6037411 
(U.S. Oct. 13, 2020); Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212, 218 (5th Cir. 2019); Kosilek v. Spencer, 
774 F.3d 63, 69 (1st Cir. 2014). 
 86. See Rogers, supra note 25, at 195 (stating that courts have recognized that in at least 
some circumstances, prisoners have a right to transition-related medical care). 
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1.  Gender Dysphoria 
According to the American Psychiatric Association (APA), gender 
dysphoria is a condition that involves an “incongruence between one’s 
experienced/expressed gender and their assigned gender.”87  It is informally 
described as the feeling of being “trapped in the wrong body.”88  Gender 
dysphoria typically results in significant distress or impaired functioning.89  
Patients experiencing gender dysphoria often exhibit “depression, anxiety, 
compulsivity, behavior disorders, personality disorders, and tendencies 
toward self-harm and suicide.”90  The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders provides criteria for diagnosing gender dysphoria.91  It 
suggests that patients must exhibit at least two of the following characteristics 
for at least six months to be diagnosed with gender dysphoria: 
1. A marked incongruence between one’s experienced/expressed gender 
and primary and/or secondary sex characteristics (or in young 
adolescents, the anticipated secondary sex characteristics). 
2. A strong desire to be rid of one’s primary and/or secondary sex 
characteristics because of a marked incongruence with one’s 
experienced/expressed gender (or in young adolescents, a desire to 
prevent the development of the anticipated secondary sex 
characteristics). 
3. A strong desire for the primary and/or secondary sex characteristics of 
the other gender. 
4. A strong desire to be of the other gender (or some alternative gender 
different from one’s assigned gender). 
5. A strong desire to be treated as the other gender (or some alternative 
gender different from one’s assigned gender). 
6. A strong conviction that one has the typical feelings and reactions of 
the other gender (or some alternative gender different from one’s 
assigned gender).92 
A wide range of treatments have been prescribed for gender dysphoria.93  
These include counseling, hormone therapy, puberty suppression, and 
GCS.94 
 
 87. Jack Turban, What Is Gender Dysphoria?, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N (Nov. 2020), 
https://www.psychiatry.org/patients-families/gender-dysphoria/what-is-gender-dysphoria 
[https://perma.cc/QU58-4GM6]. 
 88. See Susan S. Bendlin, Gender Dysphoria in the Jailhouse:  A Constitutional Right to 
Hormone Therapy, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 957, 960 (2013). 
 89. Turban, supra note 87. 
 90. Bourcicot & Woofter, supra note 19, at 286. 
 91. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 452 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-5]. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Turban, supra note 87. 
 94. Id. 
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2.  Gender Confirmation Surgery 
GCS is a procedure that typically consists of breast/chest surgery, genital 
surgery, and nongenital, nonbreast surgical interventions.95  Some gender 
dysphoric inmates believe that GCS is the only adequate way to treat their 
condition.96 
The World Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH), 
an international organization dedicated to advancing transgender health care, 
agrees that for some patients with gender dysphoria, GCS is a medical 
necessity.97  To “provide clinical guidance for health professionals to assist 
transsexual, transgender, and gender nonconforming people,” the WPATH 
created the Standards of Care for the Health of Transsexual, Transgender, 
and Gender Nonconforming People (SOC).98  The SOC lays out the 
following criteria for determining whether GCS is necessary: 
1. Persistent, well documented gender dysphoria; 
2. Capacity to make a fully informed decision and to consent for 
treatment; 
3. Age of majority in a given country; 
4. If significant medical or mental health concerns are present, they must 
be well controlled; 
5. 12 continuous months of hormone therapy as appropriate to the 
patient’s gender goals (unless the patient has a medical 
contraindication or is otherwise unable or unwilling to take hormones). 
6. 12 continuous months of living in a gender role that is congruent with 
their gender identity.99 
Although endorsed by WPATH, the necessity of GCS is not accepted by 
everyone in the medical community.100  A “minority of the medical 
community” refuses to accept that GCS is anything more than “cosmetic” 
 
 95. WORLD PRO. ASS’N FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, STANDARDS OF CARE FOR THE 
HEALTH OF TRANSSEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND GENDER NONCONFORMING PEOPLE 57 (7th ed. 
2011) [hereinafter WPATH SOC], https://www.wpath.org/media/cms/Documents/SOC 
%20v7/Standards%20of%20Care%20V7%20-%202011%20WPATH.pdf?_t=1605186324 
[https://perma.cc/N3QQ-CRJR]. 
 96. See Rena Lindevaldsen, A State’s Obligation to Fund Hormonal Therapy and Sex-
Reassignment Surgery for Prisoners Diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder, 7 LIBERTY U. 
L. REV. 15, 15 (2012) (stating that some patients with gender dysphoria believe their condition 
will only be alleviated through surgery). 
 97. WPATH SOC, supra note 95, at 1, 54. 
 98. Id. at 1. 
 99. Id. at 60. 
 100. See Brooke Acevedo, Note, The Constitutionality and Future of Sex Reassignment 
Surgery in United States Prisons, 28 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 81, 88 (2017). 
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surgery.101  These individuals reject the conclusions and authority of 
WPATH and believe that the SOC are merely “guidelines.”102 
II.  THE DISPUTE OVER GENDER CONFIRMATION SURGERY BEGINS IN THE 
FIRST CIRCUIT 
In Kosilek, a circuit court addressed for the first time whether, under the 
Eighth Amendment, a prison’s failure to provide GCS to a transgender 
inmate amounted to cruel and unusual punishment.103  Part II.A explores the 
merits of Kosilek’s Eighth Amendment claim.  Specifically, this section 
discusses the court’s holding that the prison was not deliberately indifferent 
to Kosilek’s serious medical need and provided her with adequate health 
care.  Part II.B highlights Kosilek’s influence in the split between the Fifth 
and Ninth Circuits regarding the constitutionality of a blanket ban on GCS. 
A.  Kosilek v. Spencer 
Michelle Kosilek, a prisoner assigned male at birth, had experienced 
gender dysphoria since the age of three.104  As a result of her gender identity, 
she endured tremendous mental and physical abuse throughout her life.105  In 
1992, Kosilek was sentenced to life without parole for first-degree murder of 
her then wife.106  While in prison, Kosilek attempted suicide twice.107  She 
also tied a string around her testicles to castrate herself.108 
Kosilek filed multiple lawsuits against the Massachusetts Department of 
Correction (MDOC).109  In her first suit, she alleged that the prison’s failure 
to evaluate her for gender dysphoria and provide the requisite treatment 
amounted to cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.110  
The district court held that the health care provided was inadequate but that 
the prison was not deliberately indifferent.111  To rectify this inadequacy, the 
prison provided Kosilek with hormones, electrolysis, feminine clothes, 
accessories, and therapy to alleviate her dysphoria.112  Kosilek still sought 
 
 101. See id. (first citing Melissa Pandika, A Case Against Sex Change Surgeries, OZY (Nov. 
10, 2015), https://www.ozy.com/the-new-and-the-next/a-case-against-sex-change-
surgeries/39103 [https://perma.cc/9N9W-75NN]; and then citing Julie Bindel, The Operation 
That Can Ruin Your Life, STANDPOINT (Oct. 19, 2009), https://standpointmag.co.uk/the-
operation-that-can-ruin-your-life-features-november-09-julie-bindel-transsexuals/ 
[https://perma.cc/T3FU-YCNU]). 
 102. See, e.g., Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 76 (1st Cir. 2014) (discussing the testimony 
of a licensed psychiatrist and an associate director of the John Hopkins School of Medicine 
who stated that WPATH’s SOC are just guidelines rejected by many people involved in the 
gender dysphoria field). 
 103. Id. at 68. 
 104. Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 158 (D. Mass. 2002). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 68–69. 
 107. Id. at 69. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 68. 
 110. See Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 159. 
 111. Id. at 195. 
 112. See Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 89. 
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GCS, but the prison denied her request.113  She filed a second suit alleging 
that failure to provide GCS specifically amounted to inadequate medical care 
for her gender dysphoria under the Eighth Amendment.114  After over twenty 
years of litigation, in 2012, the district court issued an injunction ordering 
MDOC to provide Kosilek with GCS.115  In 2014, the issue reached the First 
Circuit.116  The First Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of injunctive 
relief and held that MDOC’s failure to provide Kosilek with GCS was 
constitutional.117 
First, according to the court, Kosilek failed to satisfy the objective prong 
of her inadequate medical care claim.118  The court accepted that Kosilek’s 
gender dysphoria constituted a serious medical need.119  This was undisputed 
by the state.120  However, the court held that the prison’s treatment was 
adequate.121  In particular, the court found that GCS was not medically 
necessary to treat Kosilek’s dysphoria.122  The court noted that the prison’s 
treatment led to a “real and marked improvement in Kosilek’s mental 
state.”123  Kosilek’s doctors testified that since receiving such treatment, she 
was joyful and more stable.124  Kosilek even admitted that MDOC’s 
treatment “led to a significant stabilization in her mental state.”125  
Importantly, the court also acknowledged that a long period of time had 
passed since she had had suicidal ideation or attempted to castrate herself.126  
The court determined that this treatment resulted in “significant” physical 
changes and an “increasingly feminine appearance.”127  Additionally, the 
court noted that MDOC even had a plan in place to minimize the risk of future 
harm to Kosilek.128 
Moreover, the court found that the district court erroneously discredited a 
doctor’s testimony that GCS was not medically necessary for Kosilek.129  
Although the doctor did not rely on WPATH’s SOC in determining that GCS 
was not necessary, the court nevertheless found the doctor’s testimony to be 
 
 113. See Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 197 (D. Mass. 2012), rev’d, 774 F.3d 
63. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 68. 
 117. See id. at 96. 
 118. See id. at 90. 
 119. Id. at 86. 
 120. See id. 
 121. Id. at 86 (stating that the prison’s treatment “far exceeds a level of care that is ‘so 
inadequate as to shock the conscience’” (quoting Torraco v. Maloney, 923 F.2d 231, 235 (1st 
Cir. 1991))). 
 122. See id. at 90 (stating that the prison chose one of two acceptable alternative 
treatments). 
 123. Id. at 89. 
 124. Id. at 90. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 86–87.  According to the First Circuit, the district court ignored “critical nuance” 
in the doctor’s testimony and relied on a “severely strained reading.” Id. at 87. 
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credible.130  The court highlighted the testimony that indicated that the SOC 
were flexible and a product of the “lack of rigorous research in the field.”131  
The majority specifically noted that, at the time, the SOC included language 
that said, “all readers should be aware of the limitations of knowledge in this 
area.”132 
The court also determined that the subjective prong was not fulfilled.133  
The court reasoned that MDOC neither knew nor should have known that 
GCS was the only adequate treatment.134  The court noted that MDOC 
received the opinions of multiple medical professionals and was ultimately 
presented with two seemingly alternative treatment plans, one that included 
GCS and one that did not.135 
Further, the court found that MDOC was not deliberately indifferent given 
the safety concerns present in this case.136  Specifically, the court noted the 
threat to safety that arises when housing a transgender female inmate “with 
a criminal history of extreme violence against a female domestic partner—
within a female prison population containing high numbers of domestic 
violence survivors.”137  The court also cited the testimony of multiple prison 
officials who acknowledged the risk, on the other hand, of housing a 
transgender female prisoner in a facility for male prisoners.138  Lastly, 
although Kosilek’s suicidal ideation was “very real,” the court found credible 
MDOC’s concern that providing Kosilek with GCS could incentivize other 
inmates to threaten suicide to receive a desired treatment.139 
In reaching its holding, the court recognized that the Eighth Amendment 
prohibits punishments that violate society’s standards of decency.140  
However, the court did not look to any objective indicia of a national 
 
 130. Id. 
 131. See id. at 78, 87. 
 132. Id. at 87.  However, such language has since been removed from WPATH’s SOC. See 
WPATH SOC, supra note 95. 
 133. Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 91 (explaining that even if GCS was necessary, “it is not the 
district court’s own belief about medical necessity that controls, but what was known and 
understood by prison officials in crafting their policy” (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 
300 (1991))). 
 134. Id. at 91–92. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 92 (stating that, with issues of security, the policy decisions of prison officials 
“should be accorded wide-ranging deference” (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 
(1979))). 
 137. Id. at 93. 
 138. See id. 
 139. Id. at 94. 
 140. Id. at 96 (“The Eighth Amendment, after all, proscribes only medical care so 
unconscionable as to fall below society’s minimum standards of decency.” (citing Estelle v. 
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102–05 (1976))). 
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consensus, as is typically done in other Eighth Amendment cases.141  Instead, 
Kosilek relied solely on the expert testimony presented in the case.142 
B.  The Significance of Kosilek 
The holding of Kosilek was clear:  Kosilek failed to satisfy both the 
objective and subjective prong of her Eighth Amendment inadequate health 
care claim.143  Thus, denying GCS was not cruel and unusual punishment.144  
However, the implications of this holding are ambiguous.  Some courts have 
understood Kosilek to stand for the proposition that a blanket ban on GCS is 
constitutional, as GCS is never medically necessary.145  Others have 
interpreted Kosilek as merely conducting a fact-specific analysis and 
determining that GCS was not medically necessary in that particular case.146  
Given this disagreement, as a circuit split developed among the Ninth and 
Fifth Circuits regarding the constitutionality of a blanket ban on GCS, courts 
on both sides of the debate have relied on Kosilek to support their holdings.147 
III.  THE FIFTH AND NINTH CIRCUITS WEIGH IN AND SPLIT 
After Kosilek, a split emerged among the circuit courts as to the 
constitutionality of a blanket ban on GCS.148  While courts have uniformly 
accepted that gender dysphoria constitutes a serious medical need,149 a 
 
 141. See Rezabek, supra note 53, at 403–05 (discussing Kosilek and stating that “although 
courts purport to analyze punishment, medical care, and prison condition cases according to 
‘evolving standards of decency,’ which requires an examination of ‘objective indicia of a 
society’s standards,’ courts seem to largely ignore objective considerations in medical care 
cases”). 
 142. See Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 86–90 (reviewing the expert testimony before determining 
that “DOC [had] chosen one of two alternatives—both of which [were] reasonably 
commensurate with the medical standards of prudent professionals”). 
 143. See supra Part II.A. 
 144. See Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 96. 
 145. See Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212, 224–25 (5th Cir. 2019); Armstrong v. Mid-Level 
Prac. John B. Connally Unit, No. SA-18-CV-00677, 2020 WL 230887, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 
15, 2020). 
 146. See Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 794 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam), reh’g 
denied, 949 F.3d 489 (9th Cir. 2020), stay denied sub nom. Idaho Dep’t of Corr. v. Edmo, 140 
S. Ct. 2800 (2020) (Kagan, J., in chambers), and cert. denied, No. 19-1280, 2020 WL 6037411 
(U.S. Oct. 13, 2020); Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1164, 1191 (N.D Cal. 2015). 
 147. See, e.g., Edmo, 935 F.3d at 794 (citing Kosilek in support of its fact-specific analysis 
and rejection of a blanket ban on GCS); Gibson, 920 F.3d at 224–25 (relying on Kosilek to 
hold that a blanket ban on GCS is constitutional). 
 148. Compare Edmo, 935 F.3d at 796–97 (finding a blanket ban to be unconstitutional), 
with Gibson, 920 F.3d at 216 (accepting a blanket ban as within the bounds of the Eighth 
Amendment). 
 149. See Alvin Lee, Note, Trans Models in Prison:  The Medicalization of Gender Identity 
and the Eighth Amendment Right to Sex Reassignment Therapy, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 447, 
464 (2008); see also Edmo, 935 F.3d at 785 (acknowledging that many courts have recognized 
gender dysphoria as a serious medical need); Gibson, 920 F.3d at 219 (stating that the state 
does not contest that the plaintiff diagnosed with gender dysphoria has a serious medical 
need); Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 86 (“That [gender dysphoria] is a serious medical need . . . is not 
in dispute in this case.”). 
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conflict centers around the necessity of GCS.150  Part III.A of this Note 
examines Gibson, in which the Fifth Circuit held that a blanket ban on GCS 
does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment because GCS is never 
medically necessary.  Part III.B of this Note explores the contrary approach 
adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Edmo and its conclusion that GCS is 
medically necessary in certain circumstances. 
A.  The Fifth Circuit:  Gibson  
After Kosilek, the Fifth Circuit in Gibson addressed whether it was cruel 
and unusual punishment to deny a transgender prisoner GCS.151  Vanessa 
Lynn Gibson, the plaintiff, was a transgender female inmate in the custody 
of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ).152  Gibson, who had 
been diagnosed with gender dysphoria, had identified as female since age 
fifteen.153  While imprisoned for aggravated robbery, Gibson suffered from 
depression and “acute distress.”154  She tried to castrate herself and attempted 
suicide three times.155  The prison provided Gibson hormone therapy and 
counseling to treat her dysphoria.156  However, she claimed this treatment 
did not alleviate her distress and that without GCS, she would again attempt 
to commit suicide or self-castration.157  The prison denied her repeated 
requests for GCS, as the prison’s policy explicitly prohibited the use of GCS 
to treat gender dysphoria.158  Gibson filed suit against the director of TDCJ, 
arguing that the blanket ban on GCS amounted to deliberate indifference 
because it prevented the prison from even considering whether GCS was 
necessary for her.159  The Fifth Circuit rejected Gibson’s claim and upheld 
the constitutionality of a blanket ban on GCS.160 
1.  The Objective Prong 
The court held that Gibson satisfied the objective prong of her Eighth 
Amendment claim.161  Gibson’s gender dysphoria constituted a serious 
medical need as reflected by her “record of psychological distress, suicidal 
ideation, and threats of self-harm.”162  The court never explicitly addressed 
the adequacy of Gibson’s treatment.163  However, the court viewed the 
 
 150. Compare Edmo, 935 F.3d at 787 (stating that GCS can be medically necessary), with 
Gibson, 920 F.3d at 220–21 (finding that GCS is never medically necessary). 
 151. See Gibson, 920 F.3d at 215. 
 152. Id. at 216–17. 
 153. Id. at 217. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 217–18. 
 159. Id. at 218. 
 160. See id. at 226. 
 161. See id. at 219. 
 162. Id. 
 163. See id. (stating only that Gibson had a serious medical need before proceeding to the 
subjective prong of the analysis). 
2826 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
subjective prong, namely the prison’s alleged deliberate indifference, as the 
only real issue in dispute.164 
2.  The Subjective Prong 
The court held that Gibson’s Eighth Amendment claim failed to satisfy the 
subjective prong.165  The state did not act with deliberate indifference by 
implementing a blanket ban on GCS.166  In so holding, the court reasoned 
that “there is no intentional or wanton deprivation of care” when a prison 
denies an inmate a treatment that is highly contested within the medical 
community.167  According to the court, unless a treatment is “universally 
accepted” by the medical community as necessary, failure to provide such 
treatment cannot amount to deliberate indifference.168  Because the court 
found that GCS was not universally accepted, it concluded a blanket ban on 
the surgery did not violate the Eighth Amendment.169 
The court relied exclusively on the record in Kosilek to determine that GCS 
was not “universally accepted” as medically necessary.170  First, the Fifth 
Circuit rejected the acceptance of the WPATH’s SOC, which assert that GCS 
is a medical necessity.171  According to the court, the testimony in Kosilek 
demonstrated that the SOC “reflect not consensus, but merely one side in a 
sharply contested medical debate over [GCS].”172  Moreover, the court found 
that the record in Kosilek “document[ed] more than enough dissension within 
the medical community” to prove that GCS was not medically necessary.173  
As the court found that GCS is never required, it had no impetus to address 
Gibson’s individualized need and instead upheld the blanket ban. 174 
Further, the court determined that blanket bans in and of themselves do not 
amount to deliberate indifference.175  In upholding the blanket ban, the court 
relied on both the Constitution and precedent.176  The court argued that the 
 
 164. See id. 
 165. See id. at 220. 
 166. See id. at 224–25. 
 167. Id. at 220 (citing Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286, 292 (5th Cir. 2019)). 
 168. See id. at 220–21. 
 169. See id. at 224. 
 170. See Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 795 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (stating 
that Gibson “coopted the record from Kosilek” in finding that GCS is never medically 
necessary), reh’g denied, 949 F.3d 489 (9th Cir. 2020), stay denied sub nom. Idaho Dep’t of 
Corr. v. Edmo, 140 S. Ct. 2800 (2020) (Kagan, J., in chambers), and cert. denied, No. 19-
1280, 2020 WL 6037411 (U.S. Oct. 13, 2020). 
 171. See Gibson, 920 F.3d at 223 (stating that WPATH’s SOC do not reflect a medical 
consensus). 
 172. Id. at 221–22 (citing Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 76, 87 (1st Cir. 2014) (noting 
specifically that the testimonies of Dr. Chester Schmidt, a licensed psychiatrist and associate 
director of Johns Hopkins School of Medicine, and Dr. Stephen Levine, an author of 
WPATH’s SOC, expressed skepticism about the efficacy of the SOC and acknowledged that 
many medical professionals decline to adhere to them). 
 173. See id. at 223. 
 174. See id. at 223–25. 
 175. See id. at 224–25. 
 176. See id. at 225. 
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Eighth Amendment permits categorical judgments in certain contexts.177  
Additionally, the court relied on Kosilek as precedent for condoning a blanket 
ban, noting that both the Kosilek dissent and Gibson’s counsel “construed the 
logic” of the majority to allow for such a ban.178 
3.  Evolving Standards of Decency 
Gibson recognized the importance of considering evolving standards of 
decency when determining which punishments are cruel and unusual.179  Not 
only did the court cite numerous Supreme Court opinions to demonstrate this 
significance180 but it also specifically stated that “our job is to identify the 
‘evolving standards of decency’; to determine, not what they should be, but 
what they are.”181  In espousing that evolving standards of decency do not 
reflect a national consensus regarding the necessity of GCS, the court noted 
that only one state at the time had ever provided GCS to an inmate.182  Thus, 
denying such surgery could not be “unusual” or outside the bounds of 
decency.183 
B.  The Ninth Circuit:  Edmo  
Faced with a transgender prisoner’s Eighth Amendment inadequate health 
care claim, the Ninth Circuit in Edmo rejected the blanket ban on GCS 
adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Gibson.184  Adree Edmo, the plaintiff, was a 
transgender female prisoner in the custody of the Idaho Department of 
Correction (IDOC).185  She had identified as female since the age of five or 
six.186  Edmo was officially diagnosed with gender dysphoria after her arrest 
for sexual abuse of a fifteen-year-old male.187  While incarcerated, Edmo 
legally changed her name to Adree and the sex on her birth certificate to 
 
 177. See id.  The court illustrated this point by reference to the FDA. Id.  The court 
explained that the Eighth Amendment does not require an individualized assessment of an 
inmate’s need for a certain drug where the FDA has categorically banned such drug. See id. 
 178. See id. at 224–25 (citing Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 106–07 (1st Cir. 2014) 
(Thompson J., dissenting)). 
 179. See id. at 226–27 (explaining that the “fundamental flaw” in Gibson’s argument is that 
this punishment comports with evolving standards of decency) (citing Stanford v. Kentucky, 
492 U.S. 361, 378 (1989))). 
 180. See id. at 227 (first citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 976 (1991); then citing 
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. at 361, 378 (1989); then citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551, 564 (2005); and then Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863, 938–39 (2015) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting)). 
 181. Id. (quoting Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 378 (2015)). 
 182. Id. (citing Quine v. Beard, No. 14-cv-02726, 2017 WL 1540758, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 
28, 2017)). 
 183. See id. at 228. 
 184. Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 795 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“We 
respectfully disagree with the categorical nature of our sister circuit’s holding.”), reh’g denied, 
949 F.3d 489 (9th Cir. 2020), stay denied sub nom. Idaho Dep’t of Corr. v. Edmo, 140 S. Ct. 
2800 (2020) (Kagan, J., in chambers), and cert. denied, No. 19-1280, 2020 WL 6037411 (U.S. 
Oct. 13, 2020). 
 185. Id. at 767. 
 186. Id. at 772. 
 187. Id. 
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female.188  She also consistently “presented” herself as female through her 
hairstyle and makeup.189  The prison provided Edmo with hormone 
therapy.190  Edmo gained the maximum physical changes associated with this 
treatment.191  However, she continued to experience “significant distress” 
due to her genitalia.192  She specifically stated she felt depressed, 
embarrassed, and disgusted by it.193  While receiving hormone treatment, 
Edmo attempted to castrate herself twice.194  She also cut her arms with razor 
blades to help alleviate “the ‘emotional torment’ and mental anguish her 
gender dysphoria cause[d] her.”195  Edmo sought GCS, but the prison denied 
her requests.196  Although IDOC’s policy permitted GCS when determined 
necessary by the treating physician, it was deemed unnecessary for Edmo.197 
Edmo filed suit, alleging that IDOC was deliberately indifferent to her 
gender dysphoria by denying GCS.198  Specifically, she sought an injunction 
ordering the prison to perform such surgery.199  The Ninth Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s grant of an injunction, holding that GCS was medically 
necessary to treat Edmo’s dysphoria.200  In so holding, the court rejected the 
blanket ban approach endorsed by Gibson and employed a case-by-case 
analysis to determine whether the denial of GCS amounted to cruel and 
unusual punishment.201  The Supreme Court denied the state’s application 
for a stay of the injunction pending appeal202 and Edmo received her surgery 
on July 10, 2020.203 
 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 773–74. 
 195. Id. at 774. 
 196. Id. at 773. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at 775. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 767. 
 201. See id. at 794, 797 (holding that Eighth Amendment jurisprudence requires a “fact-
specific analysis” rather than a de facto ban on GCS). 
 202. Idaho Dep’t of Corr. v. Edmo, 140 S. Ct. 2800 (2020) (Kagan, J., in chambers), cert 
denied, No. 19-1280, 2020 WL 60337411 (U.S. Oct. 13, 2020). 
 203. Tommy Simmons, Idaho Transgender Inmate Becomes 2nd in Country to Receive 
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1.  The Objective Prong 
The court found that Edmo satisfied the objective prong.204  Edmo’s 
gender dysphoria constituted “a sufficiently serious medical need.”205  The 
court recognized that gender dysphoria is a serious medical condition,206 
which caused Edmo to attempt self-castration and “to feel ‘depressed,’ 
‘disgusting,’ ‘tormented,’ and ‘hopeless.’”207 
The court also found that the prison’s treatment was inadequate under the 
Eighth Amendment.208  In particular, the court held that GCS was necessary 
in this specific case.209  In reaching this conclusion, the court gave weight to 
Edmo’s experts, who explained the necessity of GCS.210  According to the 
court, Edmo’s experts were well qualified, “logically and persuasively” 
stated their opinions, and correctly applied WPATH’s SOC.211  On the other 
hand, the state’s experts, who argued that GCS was not necessary, lacked 
expertise in treating people with gender dysphoria, and either incorrectly 
applied WPATH’s SOC or failed to do so at all.212 
2.  The Subjective Prong 
Further, the court concluded that Edmo’s claim satisfied the subjective 
prong, as the prison facility consciously disregarded an excessive risk to 
Edmo’s health.213  The court found that the prison’s psychiatrist “acted with 
deliberate indifference to Edmo’s serious medical needs.”214  The 
psychiatrist knew that even with hormone treatment, Edmo had attempted to 
castrate herself twice, that Edmo suffered gender dysphoria and “clinically 
significant” distress, and that Edmo’s gender dysphoria, in the pyschiatrist’s 
words, “had risen to another level.”215  Yet, despite this knowledge, the 
prison psychiatrist never reevaluated or recommended a change in Edmo’s 
treatment plan.216 
 
 204. See Edmo, 935 F.3d at 767 (stating that Edmo had a serious medical need and that the 
treatment provided by the prison was inadequate). 
 205. Id. at 785 (first citing Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039–40 (9th Cir. 2015); 
then citing Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 86 (1st Cir. 2014); then citing De’lonta v. 
Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 525 (4th Cir. 2013); then citing Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449, 452 
(1st Cir. 2011); then citing Allard v. Gomez, 9 F. App’x 793, 794 (9th Cir. 2001); then citing 
White v. Farrier, 849 F.2d 322, 325 (8th Cir. 1988); then citing Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 
F.2d 408, 412 (7th Cir. 1987); then citing Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1164, 1187 
(N.D. Cal. 2015); and then citing Konitzer v. Frank, 711 F. Supp. 2d 874, 905 (E.D. Wis. 
2010)). 
 206. Id. (citing DSM-5, supra note 91, at 453, 458). 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 786. 
 209. Id. at 787. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 792–93. 
 214. Id. at 793. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
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3.  Evolving Standards of Decency 
Although the court never explicitly undertook an evolving standards of 
decency analysis, that principle implicitly underlies its holding.217  The court 
acknowledged the important role that evolving standards of decency play in 
an Eighth Amendment analysis.218  The language used by the court in its 
conclusion also reflects consideration of such a standard.219  The court stated 
that the “increased social awareness” of transgender health care underlay the 
court’s rejection of a blanket ban on GCS.220  The court further noted that 
this holding comports with new results in medical research, the heightened 
experience of the medical community in dealing with individuals with gender 
dysphoria, and changes in the medical community’s understanding of which 
treatments are safe and effective to treat gender dysphoria.221 
4.  Rejection of Gibson 
The Ninth Circuit rejected the blanket ban adopted in Gibson.222  The court 
noted that contrary to Gibson, there is medical consensus that GCS is 
effective and medically necessary in certain situations.223  Unlike Gibson, the 
court found that the SOC, which state that GCS can be necessary, are 
accepted by the medical community, as they have been endorsed by 
numerous prominent medical associations across the country.224  The court 
recognized that most courts also accept the SOC as the appropriate means to 
treat transgender patients.225  Additionally, every expert in Edmo agreed that 
GCS can be medically necessary in certain situations, and the state did not 
dispute this contention.226  The court also rejected Gibson’s view that Kosilek 
stands for the proposition that GCS is never medically necessary.227  The 
court determined that the only suggestion in Kosilek that GCS is never 
medically necessary came from the testimony of Dr. Cynthia Osborne.228  
However, Dr. Osborne changed her view ten years after her testimony and 
 
 217. See id. at 803 (discussing how the holding comports with contemporary standards of 
transgender health care). 
 218. See id. at 797 n.21 (stating that evolving standards of decency are “enshrined” in the 
Eighth Amendment). 
 219. See id. at 803. 
 220. See id. 
 221. See id. 
 222. See id. at 795–96 (rejecting the categorical nature of Gibson’s decision). 
 223. Id. at 795. 
 224. Id.  
 225. Id. at 769; see also, e.g, Keohane v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr. Sec’y, 952 F.3d 1257, 1298 
(11th Cir. 2020); De’lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 522–23 (4th Cir. 2013); Soneeya v. 
Spencer, 851 F. Supp. 2d 228, 231–32 (D. Mass. 2012). 
 226. See Edmo, 935 F.3d at 767. 
 227. Id. at 795. 
 228. Id. 
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had since concluded that GCS “can be medically necessary for some . . . 
including some prison inmates.”229 
Edmo found that Kosilek did not pave the way for a blanket ban on GCS.230  
Instead, the court reasoned that the Ninth Circuit simply “assess[ed] whether 
the record before it demonstrated deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s 
gender dysphoria” by employing a case-by-case analysis approach.231  The 
court emphasized that Kosilek itself specifically stated that its opinion should 
not be read to create a blanket ban on GCS, as “any such policy would 
conflict with the requirement that medical care be individualized based on a 
particular prisoner’s serious medical needs.”232  Although the Edmo and 
Kosilek courts reached opposite outcomes, the Ninth Circuit in Edmo 
reconciled the two cases by noting the factual differences.233 
Lastly, the court found that a blanket ban stands in opposition to existing 
Eighth Amendment precedent.234  According to the court, Gibson’s holding 
was contrary to “settled” Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, which requires 
a fact-specific analysis of the record in each case.235  The Ninth Circuit also 
noted that Gibson conflicted with the “decisions of this circuit, the Fourth 
Circuit, and the Seventh Circuit, all of which have held that denying surgical 
treatment for gender dysphoria can pose a cognizable Eighth Amendment 
claim.”236 
IV.  CONFORMING TO THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S APPROACH 
The constitutionality of a prison’s failure to provide GCS should be 
assessed on a case-by-case basis.  Courts should look to the specific facts of 
a case to determine whether, under the objective prong, the treatment 
provided was adequate and whether, under the subjective prong, the prison 
acted with deliberate indifference.  This necessitates a rejection of the blanket 
ban upheld in Gibson.  Part IV.A lays out the reasons why the case-by-case 
approach of Edmo should be implemented.  Part IV.B then suggests specific 
factors courts should consider when applying this approach. 
 
 229. Id. at 796 (quoting Cynthia S. Osborne & Anne A. Lawrence, Male Prison Inmates 
with Gender Dysphoria:  When Is Sex Reassignment Surgery Appropriate?, 45 ARCHIVES OF 
SEXUAL BEHAV. 1649, 1651 (2016)). 
 230. Id. at 797. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. (quoting Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 91 (1st Cir. 2014)). 
 233. Id. at 794.  First, the court noted that there are no security concerns present, as there 
were in Kosilek. Id.  Second, and most importantly, qualified medical experts disagreed about 
the necessity of GCS in Kosilek. Id.  However, the court reasoned that no such disagreement 
occurred in Edmo. Id. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. (first citing Patel v. Kent Sch. Dist., 648 F.3d 965, 975 (9th Cir. 2011); then citing 
Rachel v. Troutt, 820 F.3d 390, 394 (10th Cir. 2016); then citing Hartsfield v. Colburn, 491 
F.3d 394, 397 (8th Cir. 2007); then citing Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 859 (7th Cir. 2011); 
then citing Youmans v. Gagnon, 626 F.3d 557, 564 (11th Cir. 2010); and then citing Chance 
v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 703 (2d Cir. 1998)). 
 236. Id. at 796 (first citing Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1040 (9th Cir. 2015); then 
citing Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 552–53, 558–59 (7th Cir. 2011); and then citing De’lonta 
v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 525 (4th Cir. 2013)). 
2832 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
A.  Courts Should Employ a Case-by-Case Analysis 
A blanket ban on a medical treatment is contrary to existing Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence.  Additionally, in the context of GCS, blanket 
bans are contrary to evolving standards of decency and conflict with the 
consensus among the medical community that GCS can be medically 
necessary.  Moreover, Gibson, the only authority in support of blanket bans 
on GCS, is riddled with flaws.  It is for these reasons that courts must discard 
the categorical ban on GCS accepted by the Fifth Circuit in Gibson and 
instead adopt the approach of Edmo. 
1.  Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence Rejects Blanket Bans 
With the exception of the Fifth Circuit in Gibson, every circuit has asserted 
the necessity of a fact-specific inquiry in assessing a prisoner’s inadequate 
medical care claim.237  The majority of courts have held that a blanket policy 
prohibiting a certain medical treatment violates the Eight Amendment, as it 
“does not allow for the consideration of an inmate’s particular medical 
needs.”238  The case law overwhelmingly demonstrates that a blanket ban is 
impermissible under the Eighth Amendment, and Gibson did not cite a single 
case to refute this contention.  Therefore, Gibson is merely an outlier. 
2.  Blanket Bans on GCS Are Inconsistent with Evolving Standards of 
Decency 
Evaluating a society’s “standard of decency” requires an analysis of 
“objective indicia.”239  Kosilek, Gibson, and Edmo all recognized the 
importance of evolving standards of decency in determining cruel and 
unusual punishments.240  Yet, surprisingly, none of these courts adequately 
looked to objective indicia to determine society’s standards regarding 
 
 237. See id. at 796–97 (rejecting a blanket ban analysis); Rachel v. Troutt, 820 F.3d 390, 
394 (10th Cir. 2016) (stating that a deliberate indifference inquiry is “fact-intensive” (citing 
Hartsfield v. Colburn, 491 F.3d at 394, 397 (8th Cir. 2017))); Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 
63, 91 (1st Cir. 2014) (explaining that blanket policies would conflict with the Eighth 
Amendment’s requirement for individualized medical care); De’lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 
520, 526 (4th Cir. 2013) (finding that categorically denying evaluation for GCS establishes an 
Eight Amendment claim); Roe Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 859 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[I]nmate medical 
care decisions must be fact-based.”); Youmans Gagnon, 626 F.3d 557, 564 (11th Cir. 2010) 
(stating that deliberate indifference claims are very fact specific); Chance v. Armstrong, 143 
F.3d 698, 703 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Whether a course of treatment was the product of sound 
medical judgment, negligence, or deliberate indifference depends on the facts of the case.”); 
Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987) (finding 
that a blanket policy denying elective abortions “denies to a class of inmates the type of 
individualized treatment normally associated with the provision of adequate medical care”). 
 238. Fisher v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 484 F. Supp. 3d 521, 543 (N.D. Ohio 2020); see, 
e.g., Roe, 631 F.3d at 860 (stressing the necessity of individualized treatment under the Eighth 
Amendment). 
 239. See supra notes 51–55 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of objective 
indicia in assessing Eighth Amendment claims). 
 240. See supra Parts II.A, III.A.3, III.B.3. 
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GCS.241  Just like other Eighth Amendment cases, courts facing inadequate 
medical care claims should consider objective indicia of society’s standards 
regarding a treatment.  In the medical care context, this means considering 
factors such as whether the treatment is covered under programs like 
Medicaid or Medicare, whether laws facilitate or discourage people from 
undergoing such treatment, how accessible the treatment is, and current 
trends in the law regarding the particular treatment.242 
Objective indicia point toward a national consensus that categorically 
denying GCS would be cruel and unusual punishment.  First, GCS is now 
frequently covered under public and private health care plans.243  Medicaid 
plans in only ten states explicitly exclude GCS from coverage.244  Moreover, 
Medicare no longer excludes transition-related health care, including 
GCS.245  Instead, as with most other medical treatments, Medicare 
determines whether GCS should be covered on a case-by-case basis.246  
Additionally, more and more employers are offering health insurance plans 
that cover transition-related medical treatment.247  This includes government 
entities, Fortune 500 companies, nonprofits, and small firms.248  In fact, 
many public and private universities now cover transition-related medical 
treatments for students.249 
Second, most federal and state laws no longer discourage patients from 
seeking GCS.250  Although some state legislatures are trying to prevent 
minors from undergoing GCS, no state law currently prohibits surgeons from 
performing such surgeries on adults.251 
 
 241. See supra Parts II.A, III.A.3, III.B.3. 
 242. See Rezabek, supra note 53, at 399, 412–13 (listing these factors as reliable indicators 
of a national consensus favoring or disfavoring a treatment). 
 243. Laura Joszt, Gender-Affirming Surgeries Increasingly Covered by Private Insurance, 
Medicare, Medicaid, AM. J. OF MANAGED CARE (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.ajmc.com/view 
/genderaffirming-surgeries-increasingly-covered-by-private-insurance-medicare-medicaid 
[https://perma.cc/N4HB-H5X7]. 
 244. Equality Maps:  Healthcare Laws and Policies, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, 
lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/healthcare_laws_and_policies [https://perma.cc/NTF3-JGGH] 
(last visited Apr. 14, 2021). 
 245. Know Your Rights:  Medicare, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., 
https://transequality.org/know-your-rights/medicare [https://perma.cc/QT7C-V7TQ] (last 
visited Apr. 14, 2021). 
 246. Id. 
 247. ACLU, TRANSGENDER PEOPLE AND THE LAW:  FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 14 
(2019), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_pdf_file/lgbttransbrochurelaw2015 
electronic.pdf [https://perma.cc/UE3X-CAJP] (stating that hundreds of employers are now 
offering plans to cover transition-related treatments). 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. See Know Your Rights:  Medicare, supra note 245 (explaining that federal and state 
laws prohibit health insurance plans from refusing to cover transition-related care, such as 
GCS). 
 251. Scottie Andrews, This Year, at Least Six Sates Are Trying to Restrict Transgender 
Kids from Getting Gender Reassignment Treatments, CNN POLITICS (Jan. 22, 2020), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/22/politics/transgender-healthcare-laws-minors-
trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/U2ND-NWS9]. 
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Third, the practical barriers to receiving the surgery have decreased.  
Whereas, in the past, many individuals seeking GCS had to travel out of state 
or even out of the country,252 GCS is now dramatically more accessible in 
the United States.253  Between 2015 and 2016 alone, there was a 20 percent 
increase in the number of these surgeries performed in the United States.254  
As of 2019, GCS was performed with such frequency that it accounted for 
revenue of over $184.6 million.255  Not only are surgeries more readily 
available but medical professionals are also more educated and trained 
regarding GCS.256 
Further, recent legal trends support a national consensus favoring GCS.  At 
the time of Kosilek and Gibson, GCS for prison inmates was 
“unprecedented.”257  Only one state—California—had ever provided the 
surgery to an inmate.258  This is no longer the case.259  As of July 2020, an 
Idaho prison facility provided GCS to Adree Edmo.260  Even more indicative 
of the legal trend favoring GCS was the Supreme Court’s refusal to stay 
Edmo’s injunction pending a decision on the petition for writ of certiorari in 
that case.261  The Supreme Court’s decision allowed Edmo’s surgery to go 
forward, making the lawsuit moot.262 
Lastly, in determining which punishments are cruel and unusual, society’s 
standards must be viewed in light of the national landscape.263  Today, more 
than ever, there is a heightened awareness of the inequalities faced by 
marginalized groups and a fervent desire to protect them.  In the wake of 
movements such as Black Lives Matter, there has been a “seismic shift in the 
country” toward civil rights advocacy.264  This shift can be seen beyond just 
the context of racial equality.  It is also evident through the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Bostock v. Clayton County,265 which marked a step toward greater 
 
 252. Rezabek, supra note 53, at 418. 
 253. Alexandra Sifferlin, Gender Confirmation Surgery Is on the Rise in the U.S., TIME 
(May 22, 2017, 9:43 AM), https://time.com/4787914/transgender-gender-confirmation-
surgery/ [https://perma.cc/7AZY-ALRX]. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Michael Cook, The World Market for Sex Reassignment Is Growing, BIOEDGE (June 
7, 2020), https://www.bioedge.org/mobile/view/the-world-market-for-sex-reassignment-
surgery-is-growing/13458 [https://perma.cc/PPS3-MT86]. 
 256. See Sifferlin, supra note 253. 
 257. See Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212, 228 (5th Cir. 2019). 
 258. Id. at 227. 
 259. See Simmons, supra note 203. 
 260. Id. 
 261. See supra note 202 and accompanying text. 
 262. See supra note 203 and accompanying text; see also Idaho Dep’t of Corr. v. Edmo, 
141 S. Ct. 610 (2020) (denying a petition for writ of certiorari after Edmo’s surgery). 
 263. See supra notes 48–53 and accompanying text (explaining how the Eighth 
Amendment and what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment are shaped by society’s 
contemporary values). 
 264. See Giovanni Russonello, Why Most Americans Support the Protest, N.Y. TIMES (June 
5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/05/us/politics/polling-george-floyd-protests-
racism.html [https://perma.cc/638U-G9S6]. 
 265. 140 S. Ct 1731 (2020). 
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equality for transgender individuals.266  Transgender inmates are among such 
marginalized groups in need of protection. 
3.  The Holding in Gibson Is Fatally Flawed 
First, Gibson misinterpreted Kosilek, the case it purported to follow.  
Kosilek did not promote a blanket ban on GCS.267  Instead, Kosilek explicitly 
stated that its holding should not be read to preclude future inmates from 
receiving GCS.268  Kosilek simply performed a case-specific analysis of the 
facts on the record and determined that GCS was not medically necessary in 
that specific instance.269  The court’s holding relied heavily on language such 
as “on the record presented,” “in this case,” and “on these facts,” which are 
all inconsistent with a categorical ban.270  The court even spelled out the facts 
that doomed Kosilek’s claim.271  In stating that “this case presents unique 
circumstances,” the court pointed to Kosilek’s specific criminal history, the 
unique safety concerns at play, and the inconsistent expert opinions regarding 
the necessity of GCS for Kosilek.272 
Second, Gibson applied the wrong standard in determining whether GCS 
was medically necessary.  Gibson argued that a treatment can only be 
necessary if it is “universally accepted” by the medical community.273  
However, there is no support, within case law or in the Constitution, for the 
contention that “universal acceptance” is required.274  In fact, the court in 
Gibson did not cite a single authority to support this claim.275 
Further, the consequences of requiring this heightened standard are 
damaging.  The medical community is constantly evolving.  New drugs and 
procedures are continuously being explored and prescribed.  A universal 
acceptance standard allows prisons to continue to offer “outdated medical 
treatment plans” without adapting to changes in the medical community.276  
Additionally, such a standard allows for discrimination against transgender 
individuals.  Under this standard, just a few biased opinions from doctors in 
the medical community could render GCS medically unnecessary for Eighth 
Amendment purposes even if the majority of doctors support it.277  Further, 
 
 266. Id. at 1753 (holding that employers are unable to discriminate against employees on 
the basis of sexual orientation or transgender status). 
 267. See supra Part III.B.4. 
 268. See supra note 232 and accompanying text. 
 269. See supra note 231 and accompanying text. 
 270. See Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 91, 96 (1st Cir. 2014). 
 271. See id. at 91. 
 272. See id. 
 273. See supra notes 168–69 and accompanying text. 
 274. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 19–20, Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 
2019) (No. 18-1586), 2019 WL 2711440, at *19–20 (stating that, in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 
U.S. 304 (2002), for example, the Court determined there was a consensus against execution 
of the intellectually disabled although there was “nearly evenly split state legislative actions”). 
 275. Id. at 19. 
 276. See Braver, supra note 18, at 2260. 
 277. See id. (discussing how the universal acceptance standard could allow the “stigma 
surrounding the transgender community” to be “improperly imputed into medical 
considerations”). 
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universal acceptance is impractical and, ultimately, impossible.278  Even with 
less controversial procedures, there are always doctors who have varying 
opinions on how to treat a patient. 
Lastly, Gibson erroneously relied on the expert testimony in Kosilek to 
determine that GCS is never medically necessary.  Kosilek was decided five 
years before Gibson, and the experts in Kosilek were opining on the 
consensus of GCS at the time the testimony was presented nearly thirteen 
years earlier.279  But the court in Gibson failed to consider that in terms of 
GCS’s acceptance, much had changed in those twenty years.280  At the time 
of Kosilek, most health care plans did not cover the surgery, most legislation 
precluded individuals from receiving GCS, and the surgery was largely 
inaccessible to individuals in the United States.281  Moreover, even the state’s 
main expert, Dr. Osborne, changed her opinion about the necessity of GCS 
during that period.282  By relying on outdated testimony to conclude that GCS 
was not medically necessary, Gibson failed to account for all the changes that 
occurred between Gibson and Kosilek.283  This surely could not be the type 
of analysis our founders expected to comport with evolving standards of 
decency. 
4.  Consensus Among the Medical Community That GCS Can Be 
Necessary 
When a treatment is medically necessary, failure to provide such treatment 
constitutes an Eighth Amendment violation.284  Because there is a consensus 
among the medical community that GCS can be medically necessary, a 
blanket ban must be rejected.  First, the American Medical Association 
(AMA), the largest and oldest association of medical professionals in the 
United States,285 recognizes that GCS is medically necessary for some 
patients experiencing gender dysphoria.286  Moreover, WPATH’s SOC 
support the necessity of GCS for some patients.287  WPATH’s SOC are 
widely accepted.  They have been endorsed by the AMA; the Endocrine 
Society; the APA; the American Psychological Association; the American 
Academy of Family Physicians; the American Medical Student Association; 
the National Commission on Correctional Health Care; the American Public 
Health Association; the National Association of Social Workers; the 
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 280. See infra Part IV.B. 
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American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists; the American Society 
of Plastic Surgeons; the World Health Organization; the American College 
of Surgeons; GLMA:  Health Professionals Advancing LGBTQ Equality; the 
HIV Medicine Association; the Lesbian, Bisexual, Gay and Transgender 
Physician Assistant Caucus; and Mental Health America.288  Further, with 
the exception of the Fifth Circuit in Gibson, most courts recognize that 
WPATH’s SOC are the proper guidelines for the treatment of gender 
dysphoria.289  Even more compelling, there are “no other competing, 
evidence-based standards that are accepted by any nationally or 
internationally recognized medical professional groups.”290  As such, there 
is a medical consensus that GCS is necessary for some individuals with 
gender dysphoria. 
B.  Tools to Conduct a Case-by-Case Analysis 
Given the fact-specific nature of this inquiry, courts should consider the 
totality of the circumstances in deciding the constitutionality of a prison’s 
denial of GCS.291  If, from the totality of the circumstances, a court 
determines that GCS is necessary to alleviate an inmate’s gender dysphoria, 
such denial will violate the Eighth Amendment.  That being said, there are a 
number of factors that should weigh heavily in a court’s assessment of the 
necessity of GCS. 
First, courts should consider whether an inmate’s symptoms persisted after 
receiving other treatment.  If, after receiving alternative treatment, a 
prisoner’s actions indicate that their symptoms are alleviated, this would 
signal the adequacy of the treatment provided.292  However, if after receiving 
treatment, their actions suggest that their symptoms have persisted or 
worsened, then this would indicate that GCS might be necessary.293  This 
could be evidenced by the fact that, for example, even after being prescribed 
hormones or other dysphoria treatments, the inmate continues to exhibit 
symptoms of depression and continues to engage in acts of self-harm. 
Second, courts should consider the patient’s own evaluation of the 
treatment provided.  Doctors rely heavily on their patients’ statements in 
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prescribing treatments.294  Take, for example, a patient who complains of a 
pain on the lower right-hand side of the body.  The doctor may ask the patient 
to describe the pain on a scale of one to ten to determine the appropriate 
treatment.  If the patient rates the pain as a one, the doctor may determine 
that it is likely only soreness or a cramp and prescribe an aspirin.  If, on the 
other hand, the patient describes the pain as a nine or a ten, the doctor may 
have reason to believe this is appendicitis and prescribe further testing and 
maybe even hospitalization.  Thus, a patient’s own assessment of symptoms 
is crucial to diagnosis and treatment.  There is good reason for this.  First, 
doctors cannot follow their patients around twenty-four hours a day, so they 
cannot truly see the symptoms of the patients.  Second, many ailments do not 
have overtly physical manifestations and, thus, a doctor must rely on the 
patient’s own description.  This should be no different in the context of a 
transgender prisoner. 
Although weighing the inmate’s own evaluation could in theory create 
incentives for inmates to make empty threats of self-harm, lie, or otherwise 
exaggerate their illnesses to receive their desired treatments, this should not 
be of substantial concern.295  Inmates’ statements are only one of many 
factors that courts should consider in determining the necessity of GCS.  
Thus, courts should be able to ferret out the artificial or exaggerated claims 
by considering the totality of the circumstances.  Moreover, this “problem” 
is not unique to inmates seeking GCS but rather is applicable to all inmates 
seeking a specific treatment.296  And yet, in other inadequate medical care 
contexts, courts have mandated consideration of inmates’ own complaints.297  
Thus, there is no reason to treat claims for GCS any differently. 
Third, courts should rely heavily on the testimony of medical experts in 
determining an inmate’s need for GCS.  Courts already depend on expert 
testimony when assessing medical claims “[b]oth inside and outside the 
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Eighth Amendment context.”298  This standard should apply with equal force 
in the context of inmates seeking GCS.  Evaluating the adequacy of a medical 
treatment is “typically beyond the competence of a non-medical 
professional.”299  Moreover, courts should pay particular attention to the 
expert’s familiarity in treating transgender individuals.300  The more 
experience a medical professional has with transgender health issues, the 
more credibility the opinion should be given. 
Finally, courts should consider whether an inmate qualifies for GCS under 
WPATH’s SOC.  The SOC lay out criteria that, if met, indicate the necessity 
of GCS.301  The SOC were specifically created to assist medical 
professionals in determining the best treatment for transgender patients.302  
Moreover, the SOC are widely endorsed in the medical community.303  
Therefore, they are a valuable and credible diagnostic source in determining 
the necessity of GCS.  However, because WPATH acknowledges that the 
SOC are just “guidelines” and that treatment should be determined on an 
individualized basis, courts should not just blindly adhere to them.304  It is 
for this reason that WPATH’s SOC should just be one of the factors courts 
consider when conducting a case-by-case analysis. 
CONCLUSION 
The Eighth Amendment was designed to respect fundamental human 
dignity, to ensure that the needs of prisoners are adequately met, and 
ultimately, to adapt and evolve alongside society’s values.  In the wake of 
heightened social awareness and a nationwide movement toward equality, it 
would be contrary to the foundational principles of the Eighth Amendment 
to broadly ignore the needs of transgender inmates.  Instead, courts must 
determine on a case-by-case basis the necessity of GCS and whether a 
prison’s denial constitutes an Eighth Amendment violation.  Any other 
finding would simply be cruel and unusual. 
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